#Conax hack how to#
#Conax hack upgrade#

#Conax hack how to#

It focus specifically on CAN and it provides very useful hints such as how to guess the baud rate and how to find and tap into the CAN bus wires in your vehicle.

#Conax hack upgrade#

I also recommend this very good article: How to Hack and Upgrade Your Car, Using CAN Bus by Jared Reabow. If you want to understand better how CAN bus is used by the automotive vendors to control the engine and other components of your vehicle, I recommend taking a look at the THE CAR HACKER’S HANDBOOK by Craig Smith.

Car Hacking OverviewĬar hacking with CAN ( Controller Area Network) has been already very well covered by several authors. It would allow the victim to eventually connect other OBDII devices to the vehicle without, hopefully, noticing the rouge ChupaCarBrah device. If the attacker is nasty enough, he/she may use glue to permanently fix the splitter to the OBDII port.

The OBDII splitter cable used will provide an extra female OBDII connector in front of the vehicle original one. The device is small enough allowing it to be hidden inside the dashboard. Once inside the vehicle, an attacker can quickly connect the ChupaCarBrah to the OBDII port. valet parking, car wash, forgetting doors unlocked, etc).ĬhupaCarBrah installation: gone under 60 seconds But I still want to bring awareness for the importance of considering encryption solutions for CAN messages by manufacturers and awareness for car owners on situations where they do not have complete control over the physical access to the vehicle (e.g. Because of that, I consider the security risk exposed by this article as low. However, for a complete pen-testing engagement using ChupaCarBrah, you would still need to combine what I show here with other attack techniques such as key spoofing to get access to the interior of the vehicle. The spy device creates a bridge between the isolated CAN buses and the internet, breaking the manufacturer’s threat model. The goal of this article is to challenge it and show in practical terms what could be done if an attacker gets physical access to a vehicle and installs the ChupaCarbrah. The security level for adopting that threat model will be directly proportional on how hard it is to get physical access to the CAN bus, and/or how difficult it is to exploit vulnerabilities on external connections to pivot into the CAN bus. The gateways provide logical separation by forwarding CAN messages in one way direction only. Gateways are common when CAN and external networks do need to be connected (e.g. The separation can be physical (air gaps) or logical (CAN gateways/firewalls). In general, car manufacturers adopt a threat model based on reducing the attack surface on the vehicle by creating a separation between the CAN bus and external networks. I plan to also extend the AWS service with POST endpoints which will allow CAN commands to be submitted to the vehicle by creating a reverse HTTP session via cellular network. The GUI with live data will also display current vehicle information (speed, RPM, etc) from the decoded CAN messages. Part 3 - Vehicle RCE: I plan to extend the ChupaCarBrah application to display all data being exfiltrated on the fly in a more user friendly format such as GPS data plotted on a map. For safety reasons I plan to cover only harmless commands, such as unlock doors, open power windows, etc I will focus on reverse engineering the CAN messages to send crafted commands to the ECU. Part 2 - ECU CAN messages: Will show how to tamper CAN buses that connect directly to an ECU (since the OBDII usually provides only diagnosis data). As a follow-up to this write-up, I plan to publish two more articles to extend the current ChupaCarBrah capability: